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Europe's energy revolution – Opportunities and constrains

18.11.2010 | Sdílet

Celé znění příspěvku Mirka Topolánka v angličtině:

SOUTHERN CORRIDOR

I am very pleased to be here today and come up with a contribution concerning the issue of the Southern Corridor. It was one of the main topics of the priority energy dossier during the Czech EU Presidency.

This topic was very important also for me personally, so I tried to do my best for the successful implementation of the Southern Corridor. I have been in Central Asia and the Caspian two times during the Czech presidency and two times now, and I personally spoke with the leaders of these countries. I am convinced that these countries have a deep interest in diversifying their exports of energy sources. However, their efforts are limited by many factors. Unfortunately, one of the key limitations is European inability to meet our strategic goals in energy sector and our low flexibility in responding to development in the producing regions.

Unlike our major competitors in Caspian region – China and Russia – we are not able to use all power we have, in order to meet our strategic goals. That negative fact is caused by absence of common and coherent external energy policy. Another factor which contributes to above mentioned disability is still insufficient support for European companies trying to implement projects within the Southern Corridor.

Low efficiency of our current European external energy policy is best illustrated by the Turkmen example. Turkmenistan is a key Caspian gas producer and the country plays an important role in the process of successful implementation of the Southern Corridor. However the Turkmen gas export rapidly decreases and practically collapsed after the explosion on main Turkmen export pipeline in 2009. Turkmenistan was desperately searching for ways and means for diversifying its export routes in that time.

The needed diversification wasn’t provided to Turkmenistan by Europe, who has been referring to the new infrastructure projects in the Caspian region for more than 10 years, but by China. China was able – without long discussions – to built and put into operation the export pipeline with a length of 7000 km in only three years. Moreover, at the time when the export of Turkmen gas to Russia was suspended, China provided loans that helped Turkmenistan overcome the impending financial collapse. So, China was able by these loans or prepayments to ensure Turkmen gas supplies for next several years.

The construction of gas pipeline „Turkmenistan – China“ was not only an important energy project, but it has also significantly changed the geopolitical situation in Central Asia, where the Chinese influence has notably increased. In addition, Turkmenistan resumed – at reduced rates – gas supplies to Russia and also enlarged its export capacity to Iran at the begining of this year. Nowadays Turkmenistan has effectively diversified its export routes, and the country is no longer actively seeking for further diversification. This diversification provides – for the first time in history – to Turkmen government an opption to choose their gas subscribers. It is logical that the future gas contrats with Turkmenistan will be signed on the principle of the best offer. The best offer does not mean only the highest price, but this formula contains also many other economic, political and security factors.

The European passivity is underlined by the fact that for the Turkmen government is the construction of the new pipeline through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India much more realistic than building up the interconnector to Europe.

Although China is going to become the largest importer of Turkmen gas till 2013, the main European competitor for the Turkmen and Caspian gas remains Russia. The new Russian contract for Turkmen gas fell by 40 bcm per year in comparison with the previous one. Moreover Turkmenistan exports to Russia only 12 bcm this year. But the giant gas field Osman – South Yolatan, which is located in eastern Turkmenistan has huge potential for a rebound in exports – not only in Russian direction. Turkmenistan is currently at the beginning of the process of construction of the East-West Pipeline, which would bring natural gas from the giant deposits of the Osman – South Yolatan to the Caspian Sea. I would like to underline that it is direction from – not – to the Chinese border. These gas volumes would then be divided among Russia, Iran and Europe (including Turkey). However, if Europe won’t be able to implement the Southern Corridor, the gas will go only to Russia and Iran.

The construction of the trans-Caspian pipeline remains very problematic due to the ongoing territorial disputes on the Caspian Sea. Building up of LNG terminals on the Turkmen and Azeri shore of the Caspian seems to be more realistic option for bringing Central Asia’s gas to Europe in this light. I am aware that LNG transportation over Caspian Sea gives no sense under current conditions. But it may be perspective option for the near future.

Russia is also the European competitor in Azerbaijan, where increases its activity. Azerbaijan still intends to sell its gas production mainly to Europe. On the other hand, the highest Azeri interest is to strengthen national security and to preserve territorial integrity. Russia can also use the strategic issue of Nagorno-Karabakh as a special tool for gaining Azeri gas. Russian-Georgian war of 2008 clearly demonstrated the limits of European and Western security policy and Azerbaijan is well aware of it. The Azerbaijan’s ap­proach to the gas issue is now based on much more realistic and less ideological basis. This new Azerbaijan’s policy has enabled the Russian to more than double their gas import from Azerbaijan since 2008. The crucial question for us is where this trend stops.

A lot of hope is nowadays placed into the Iraqi gas. However, it is not clear how much Iraqi gas will be available for Europe in next few years. It depends on an agreement concerning the use of raw materials and distribution of profits from their exports between the central Iraq’s government and the Kurdish minority. This Agreement has been negotiated since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime – unfortunately without any success. In addition, the main priority of the central government in Baghdad is to restore the oil export potential of the country. The issue of gas sector development is not so crucial for the central government. (Regarding the Iranian gas it is evident that this gas is for Europe completely out of the game under current political situation in Iran.)

Despite these unfavorable conditions, it is absolutely important for Europe not to give up implementation of the Southern Corridor. The concept of the Southern Corridor serves not only as the mean for securing alternative energy sources for Europe, but it should also create a wide zone of stability and prosperity behind the European borders. Enlargement of European norms and standards far beyond those borders should become another positive result of implementation of the Southern Corridor.

Southern Corridor is not just one way scheme for transport of energy resources from producers to consumers, but it should serve also as a tool for transfer of knowledge, technologies and investments that will go in opposite direction – from consumers to producers.

Nowadays, almost all European competitors are able to offer the producers world prices for their resources and they are also able to provide them political and security guarantees in many cases. Europe, however, can offer to the producer also something more than money. We have huge potential to provide the producers investment, know-how and technology necessary for modernization of their countries. It is probably the only way how we can be more attractive for the producers than our competitors from China or Russia. Southern Corridor could be the first example of this new European strategy in the competition for the global energy resources in the 21 Century.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that the basic precondition for the successful implementation of this new strategy will be creation of a real effective common and coherent European external energy policy.

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